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“Turkey has made its choice and this choice is democracy.”
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan​[1]​


Abstract

This article discusses the role of the Kurdish Issue in the democratic and European opening of Turkey. Turkey has long been presented as a role model for Muslim polities. A ‘vicious triangle’ model is utilized to reveal how crucially the reality of this role-model image depends on the balancing act between democratization, Europeanization, and the Kurdish Issue. This paper counters prevailing views that any changes in the Kurdish Issue are the result of EU accession pressures. By highlighting AKP’s ‘Kurdish Initiative’ and the Kurds’ own impetus for change, the analysis suggests a resolution pre-accession to meet Kurdish demands within a Turkish political framework.

1. Introduction

The focus of this article is Turkey’s Kurdish Issue within the context of the country’s recent policy of ‘democratic opening’​[2]​ reflected in the AKP’s ‘Kurdish Initiative’.​[3]​ In the context of this issue, I consider the important question of what role does the Kurdish factor play in Turkey’s ‘democratization’ and, by extension, its ‘Europeanization’ process? This study aims to bridge the gap in the literature concerning the role of the Kurdish Issue in the democratic (and thus European) opening of Turkey as a diachronic but simultaneously contemporary subject whose rapid development is complex to describe. The themes explored in this article are a continuation of the extended analysis of the nature of the Kurdish Issue in Turkey, and US-Kurdish relations.​[4]​ Focusing on Turkey as a case-study and using the occasion of the negotiations opened in October 2005 for the country’s accession to the European Union (EU), I question Turkey’s ‘democratization’, while also showing the relation of ‘democratization’ and ‘Europeanization’ to the Kurdish Issue.​[5]​ Many studies have been conducted on the Kurds and the role of Kemalism versus Islam in Turkey, as well as the impact of Kemalism on the emergence of Islamic political movements, including the conceptualization of the Kurdish situation within the Islamist discourse.​[6]​ However, I choose to examine the situation from a viewpoint that has been largely overlooked so far, the Kurdish Issue as a central factor in the analysis of Turkey’s ‘democratization’ as part of the country’s tentative accession process to the EU. Indeed, the Kurdish factor in Turkey’s ‘democratization’ attempts, of which its ‘Europeanization’ process is a notable expression, can actually be seen as a positive element in the development of Turkey’s socio-political system. 
Previous studies on Kurdish–Turkish relations under the prism of Ankara’s potential EU accession have mostly examined the EU-Kurdish dimension as a one-way relationship where the emphasis is on how the EU can provide the Kurds with legal recognition and a safer living environment.​[7]​ However, I will seek to demonstrate that it is actually a dual process where the Kurdish Issue also creates a demand for EU activity. AKP’s Kurdish initiative –despite the fact that Ankara has a long way to go for its implementation– paves the way and promises a potential solution to the Kurdish Issue. Yet, such policy should sufficiently address the broader context of increasing Kurdish demands for an end to military operations against Kurds, the removal of the 10 percent threshold of the national vote for political parties to enter parliament, the demands for the release of political prisoners, the inclusion of the Kurdish language in the school curriculum, and EU calls on Turkey to accelerate the pace of its human rights reforms. If not implemented, it could cause further deterioration in the already tense Turkish-Kurdish relations.​[8]​ All these factors need to interact in order to produce the democratization of Turkish politics as far as the Kurdish Issue is concerned. The empirical base for this study is drawn from existing secondary literature, but also careful analysis of the issue’s coverage in a representative sample of local and international newspapers together with interviews undertaken in Turkey (Diyarbakir) with Kurdish and Turkish interviewees.
Specifically, I focus on the period from 2002 onwards as the time when real change in Turkey’s political discourse and practice began to operate. I argue that the starting-point for this important development in the Turkish political scene towards a commitment that seemingly favors democratic reforms was on the 3rd November 2002 when the victorious Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won 34 per cent of the national vote. The analysis of the present political scene where conflicting groups are at odds is illuminating for two reasons. The differing interests within the state represented by secularist forces (such as the Kemalists) and the military structure, the policies of different Kurdish groups and the role of Islamists, not only form the basis of the tense socio-political dialogue which preoccupied Turkey so far, but also constitute the core of Turkey’s ‘Europeanization’ wager. Such diversity makes analysis of Turkey’s structure particularly fascinating. Yet, it is only the peaceful co-existence of all these dynamics that can guarantee a democratic Turkey. For this purpose, many changes are needed, not just to satisfy the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, but, more importantly, to interconnect directly with the necessary alterations to Turkey’s internal structures and proposed constitutional reforms which in turn are inextricably linked with the implementation of Erdoğan’s policy of the ‘Kurdish Opening’. 
The rise to power of the AKP (2002) not only re-oriented Turkish domestic and foreign policy, but proved that its coalescence with a more tolerant Islamic doctrine that kept abreast of the demands of the times was a winning combination that could accommodate both Islam and democracy. For this aspect alone, Turkey’s particularity and innovation is well worth studying. However, Turkey’s democratic opening, along with its European journey, is the result not only of Erdoğan’s policies, but the supportive role played by the US from the Bush era up to the present day.​[9]​ In this dual process, the Kurdish Issue has a critical role to play. I first identify briefly the ideological convergence of the concept of democracy with Islam, and then examine how such iideological frameworks can co-exist within Turkish politics in light of AKP’s dominance in Turkey’s present-day political scene as the main agent behind the country’s democratic initiatives and its Islamic character. In this process I aim to reveal a) the role of Islam in AKP’s agenda towards democratization; b) the extent to which such reforms are realistic when considered against current Turkish political structure, and c) whether, and how, such changes might ultimately be achieved. 


2. Democracy and Islam: An Uneasy Coalition? 

A brief overview of the relation between Islam and democracy is necessary for the better understanding of the role of Islam within the Turkish context and in connection to AKP’s policies towards democracy and the Kurds. The compatibility between Islam and democracy is a topic of absorbing interest in both past and present literature, but problems frequently arise due to the simplistic perception of ‘Islam’ per se as a system of ‘inflexible’ governance in countries adhering to the Islamic religion, especially when contrasted with vague generalities about what exactly democracy stands for. The resultant confusion seems to stem from the deep division between the “private and public” faces of “faith and politics”, and the identification of legality with the foundational elements of shariah or Islamic Law by which Islam is recognized.​[10]​ This is often the case because such principles, inherent in the socio-political systems of those states, constitute an ideological platform. As far as democracy is concerned, the concept has been depicted via figures and numerous explanations, often perceived ranging from political regimes right down to minimalist conceptions of democracy.​[11]​ Thus, democracy prompts a diversity of conceptual approaches, while its application can be perceived differently from state to state, especially in the Middle East region.​[12]​ Therefore, I do not focus on such approaches, seeing them as tools to enable democracy to be variously achieved, and, as such, differently implemented. 
Against assertions of dichotomies, mistaken epithets as Western, and similar confusions, democracy’s etymological root as derived from the Greek term ‘demokratia’ circa fourth century BC describes a system operating for the common good which represents a collective wisdom where “the rule (Kratein) is in the hands of demos (people), of many, not of the few”. ​[13]​ In this sense, Islam as “a socio-political system” – in which the ummah prevails over the individual, and the leader, historically, was “selected through a process of consultation, nomination, and election” – is not far from the ideological motive behind democracy as a mode of governance.​[14]​ Yet it is not that simple. Conservative circles (whether secularists, rejectionists, or extremists) question Islam’s compatibility with democracy, while some modern reformers consider Islam supportive of democracy in a sense that it promotes justice and equality.​[15]​ This difference of opinion rests on the role religion is perceived to play. In Islam “law is viewed as God-ordained and not man-made, and integral to the state and society, so that religion sets the ideological foundation of the community’s political and social life”, whereas in democracy religion, though important, is less involved. Thus, democracy’s premise that power is in the hands of the majority of the citizens who select their decision-makers – who are in turn accountable to the citizenship – and appear to be the rulers of their own selves,​[16]​ along with the inclusive role religion has in state affairs as distinctive, but not separate, from the state, underlines the basic concept of democracy’s differentia from Islam. Although Islam and democracy may be ideologies with different colorings, there is still some degree of compatibility as modes of governance in that both aim to assure the operation of the polity for the sake of the common good. As far as the Muslim polities are concerned, the decision whether to apply democracy, and how far, depends very much on the context and individual needs of each state as well as the extent of Islam’s inclusion in its state affairs. Islamic states could then accommodate themselves to twenty-first century mores, cast off any form of internal or external manipulation, and introduce a genuine type(s) of democracy for the Muslim world in the form of an Islamic democracy. Accordingly, how Islam is perceived and applied in Turkish politics will greatly influence Turkey’s democratic opening as the next section explains. 


2.1. Political Islam: Considerations on Its Role in Turkey’s Democratization 

In Turkey’s case, I will show how Islam has played a minimal role in Turkish politics up till now and why it cannot therefore be blamed as an impediment to the country’s liberalization processes in connection to the Kurdish Issue and in view of AKP’s Islamic character. The subordination of religion to the administration, and the subsequent triumph of the state over religion in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922), along with the prioritizing of the unity of the state with regard to its social, cultural, and ethnic heterogeneity, can be seen throughout Turkish history as indicators of Turkey’s subjection to military governance rather than religious rule as well as of the state’s imperial character. The establishment of the Republic of Turkey (24 July 1923) was based upon the idea of achieving the homogeneity of the state through specific principles.​[17]​ Mustafa Kemal’s victorious War of Independence (1919-1923) saved the remnants of the Turkish Empire. The victorious military, now regarded as safeguard of the state, rapidly gained a strong footing within the government, virtually awarding themselves a blank cheque for governance. 
Until recently, the undisputed legitimization of the military’s activities as working for the benefit of the state has been a common policy, both in word and deed.​[18]​ Hence, the configuration of an unquestioned model of governance exercised by the military has historically shaped the Turkish decision-making system. Indeed, military intervention via three successive coups d’état in 1960 (27 May), 1971 (12 March) and 1980 (12 September) reached its height in 1997 with the military’s ‘velvet’ coup (the 28 February process), although more recently an ‘electronic’ coup by the military (2007) was unsuccessful.​[19]​ Also, only four of Turkey’s ten Presidents have not come from a military background.​[20]​  Further evidence of Kemalist support for militarism in preference to Islam is the lawsuit in the Supreme Court of Appeals to close down the AKP (Justice and Development Party) because of its anti-secular activities described by Turkey’s public prosecutor as “the only option to resort to”, along with the military’s so-called ‘midnight memorandum’ (27/04/2007) which was essentially a veiled threat of potential military intervention.​[21]​ In addition, Turkey’s foundation on the basis of Kemal’s principle of secularism (Laiklik) – maintained undisputed until today – leaves no space for the direct involvement of Islam as a religion in the country’s politics and, as such, differentiates Turkey, given its ‘Islamic character’, from the rest of the countries in the broader area of the Middle East.​[22]​ Rabasa argues that the divide in Turkish politics today is not between secularists and Islamists, but rather between nationalists (or statists) and reformers. According to the Turkish PM “we [the AKP party] are against ethnic nationalism, regional nationalism and religious chauvinism ...”​[23]​ and “Turkey has achieved the balance between Islam, democracy, secularism and modernity”. ​[24]​ Even though Turkey has signed the Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (1963), and the Customs Union Treaty (1 January 1996), albeit as a non-member​[25]​, belongs to the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), to the Council of Europe, and was also granted the status of a candidate country in the Helsinki European Council (December 1999), the military until very recently has played the dominant role in Turkey’s political life. A series of episodes up to the end of the 1990s including the interference of the military in political life (coup of 1997), the leak of the 1997 EMASYA secret protocol,​[26]​ various corruption scandals leading to the country’s financial crisis in 2001, and the collapse of the coalition government of Mesut Yilmaz and Bülent Ecevit (February 2001),​[27]​ have been indicative of a Turkish democracy in appearance rather than in essence.​[28]​ Turkey’s failure to achieve a stable democracy by the end of the 20th century can be attributed to a number of causes. These include the inequality and limited involvement of certain Turkish citizen groups in politics, and the economic underdevelopment of the South-East in contrast to the rest of the country, while another important element has been the superiority of military authority over civilian bureaucracies as guardians of the state’s unity and territorial integrity.​[29]​ Also significant is the rise of Turkey’s original multi-cultural indigenous population, namely the Kurds, originally forced into Turkification by the Turkic tribes, but now seeking their own voice, a key factor in the emergence of current issues such as Turkey’s Kurdish Issue.​[30]​ 
It would appear that the country’s political history, based mainly on the role of the military and the centralization of state power around it, along with the state’s imposition of Turkish identity upon its heterogeneous society, and the formation of political mechanisms excluding Islam has hindered Turkey’s democratic opening. Cizre’s comment on how the submission of Islam to the state – rather than its separation from it – and the way it is grounded in Turkey’s secularism is indicative of the role, and accordingly the limited share, that Islam plays in Turkey’s political status.​[31]​ AKP’s rise in power over the last ten years vis-à-vis the latest Turkish elections (12 June 2011) has inspired many scholarly discussions about “Turkey’s transition to a post-nationalism era”.​[32]​ This concept is based around alterations brought into Turkish politics by Islamist political figures advocating changes rooted in liberal ideas rather than seeking to establish an Islamic state against Kurdish assertions – the position mainly of BDP – who argue over the governmental policy of Islam’s instrumentalization in politics which aims at the “creation of an Islamic-democratic model supported by the US”.​[33]​ Identifying thus AKP’s political discourse and practice, the paper ultimately aims to explore their compatibility with the constitutional reforms the party proclaims to be able to realize in relation to the Kurdish Issue. 


2.2. An Overview of AKP 

AKP achieved success and ended the series of successive coalition governments that had held power since 1991 when it increased its share of the vote to 42 per cent in the local elections held on 28 March 2004. This enabled AKP to win with an overwhelming majority (46.6 per cent) in the national elections on 22 July 2007​[34]​, further increasing its votes by 50.4 per cent in 2011. According to Rabasa, AKP’s success should be attributed to economic and social factors rather than an appeal to Islam.​[35]​ The rise in power of AKP was accompanied by Erdoğan’s commitment to the goal of EU membership for Turkey, the rewriting of the 1982 Consitution, the maintaining of the Kemalist principle of secularism, and the end of the era of coups d’état in Turkey.​[36]​ Even though there are different trends within the Islamist groups in Turkey, including advocates of secularism, leftist democrats, and other forces variously involved in politics​[37]​, three main religious movements can be identified​[38]​: “fundamentalists who resist modernization”; “Islamists who utilize Islam as a modern political ideology”; and the “Revivalist movement that tries to reconcile traditional Islam with modernity”. In this last category, we find groups such as the Naqshbandi Brotherhood and the İskenderpaşa Community.​[39]​ Bearing in mind our initial position that Islam is comprised of both the social and the political, AKP seems to fit into the third category. ​[40]​ According to Demirci, “revivalist Islamists favours a market economy and the integration into a democratic secular system”.
AKP’s interest in politics as “social responsibility” mobilizes their “political awareness through participation in a democratic system” and aims at the “election of the best available candidates”. However, the main difference lies in their aim to “combine traditional practices of the past with concerns of the present”. A modernistic compromise thus constitutes the core of their ideology.​[41]​ At the same time, the İskenderpaşa Community’s “secular position – apart from the democratic one – enables the Muslims’ political participation without the community’s politicization” and reveals its broader perception of politics.​[42]​ When comparing the basic principles embodied in the revivalists’ Islamic discourse with Erdoğan’s own principles, they can be seen to take a similar line. According to Erdoğan: “[Our government] demonstrates that a religious person can protect the idea of secularism. In the West the AKP is always portrayed as being rooted in religion. This is not true. We can speak about the place of Muslims in modern society and their contribution to a modern way of life.” Thus “the accommodation of democracy within AKP’s Islamic character is not only compatible with the democratization of the country but is also followed by reforms for the sake of such democracy”.​[43]​ However, Erdoğan does not adopt the “common good of the ummah” from Islam as his guiding principle, but he claims to have adjusted this to the demands of the 21st century via participation in social, and subsequently political, affairs. In this context, the ideology of egalitarianism is implemented. Such an idea is not only the mission of Islam, but a basic humanitarian need for the survival of all civilized societies. It is made then clear that when talking about the Justice and Development Party (AKP), we refer to a political movement with Islamic roots operating within the framework of a secular system while respecting the boundaries between religion and state.​[44]​ 
It is the first time in the country’s history that the hostility of the military leadership to governmental decisions of this type has been successfully overcome, making it clear that Turkey is indeed set on a trajectory towards democratization. These democratization efforts by the AKP have developed an identity known as ‘Conservative Democracy’.​[45]​ The AKP’s ideology of ‘Conservative Democracy’ was presented publicly in an international symposium where Erdoğan emphasized that the AKP’s understanding of conservatism did not mean the conservation of established institutions and relations, but implied the protection of important values and principles, while pursuing progress. He stressed that using religion as a political instrument was harmful to social peace, political diversity, and religion itself. For him, the AKP aims to synthesize local and universal values, tradition and modernity, and morality and rationality.​[46]​
AKP’s loyalty to the principle of secularism was further reinforced by the party’s conclusion that it was “unacceptable to make use of religion for political, economic and other interests or to put pressure on people who think and live differently by using religion”.​[47]​ In addition, the party claims to support a passive secularism in the sense of the “state’s neutrality toward all religions and doctrines” so that an individual’s “religious rights and freedoms” can be ensured.​[48]​ Unlike the dialogue of his predecessors from whom the AKP movement seceded, Erdoğan’s discourse appears more modern,​[49]​ although this by no means implies that Turkey should be regarded as the “model of a very progressive and democratic Muslim state”​[50]​ which should be imitated by the rest of the Middle Eastern countries at the behest of the US.​[51]​ There is a two-fold rationale that shows why Turkey as “an example of a Muslim country that is modernized”, and the best democratic Muslim model as depicted during the Bush era, is inappropriate.​[52]​ Each country in the Middle East has its own characteristics that make it unique. Turkey’s secularization process (which directly questions comparisons with other Middle East countries) began after the Ottoman era, while geographically it is situated between Europe and the Middle East. Thus, any US strategy favouring democratic development and aiming to transform the region through Turkey, or any other specific country, is deeply flawed. Indeed, every state should be able to find its own developmental path via its own mechanisms and functions rather than follow ‘copy and paste’ patterns. 
Therefore Turkey cannot be said to constitute an ‘example’ in the full sense of the word.​[53]​ Not only is it unable to be categorized as a full democracy as long as key issues including the Kurdish Issue continue to hang over it as explained in the European Union’s 2009, 2010 and 2011 progress reports on Turkey, but also because each society needs to find its own ways of progressing towards democracy.​[54]​ On this basis, Turkey’s democratic enterprises so far can at best be viewed as somewhat insecure. However, the Turkish case, even though still in the melting pot, offers encouragement to other societies in the broader Middle East. Through its example it inspires efforts to resolve social and political imbalances, and thereby achieve political development and greater egalitarianism via a more inclusive participation of the citizenship.​[55]​


3. The AKP’s Europeanization Process 
and the Kurdish Issue

The AKP’s rise to power coincided with the election of George W. Bush as US President, while from 2002 their mutual co-operation was further consolidated​[56]​ with Bush’s declaration of the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative Plan’ (November 2003) aiming at regional democratization.​[57]​ However, democratization is not an entirely straightforward process. The presentation of Turkey by the Bush administration as the “most successful example of secular democracy in Muslim-populated countries”​[58]​ stems from crucial US interests in the region and especially in “the Middle East [which] has replaced Europe in America’s core national security interests”.​[59]​ When one considers the US perception of the Turkish role as a vital “bridge between West and the chaotic Middle East”,​[60]​ it quickly becomes abundantly clear why “the US must be friends with Turkey” as stated by Nicholas Burns.​[61]​ European Union’s 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 reports on the obstacles to Turkey’s progress, along with the CIA’s 1992 reports prophesying that “US support for Turkey will be challenged by Ankara’s human rights failures on the Kurdish Issue, and US ability to ease the Turks toward greater political and cultural liberalization of pluralism…would take years to develop”,​[62]​ suggest that Turkey still has a long road to follow before “the modernizing reforms that Turks and Ottoman Turks brought 150 to 160 years ago to the Middle East” will actually work.​[63]​ 
Yet, the promising reforms initiated again by the AKP, following the blueprint of Turgut Özal’s innovative Kurdish discourse in the early 1990s as a landmark in Turkey’s Kurdish politics, could produce positive changes for the majority of the society.​[64]​ 
It is interesting that the two main issues challenging Turkey today – the Kurdish Issue, and the role of Islam – are now found right at the top of the Turkish domestic agenda in view of the AKP’s ruling on the one hand​[65]​, and the increase in Kurdish votes from 5.5 per cent of the national vote in 2007 general elections compared to the 6.6 percentage in the elections of 2011 on the other. In spite of progress made so far, Turkey still seems to have a long way to go according to the EU Commission and the European Court of Human Rights.​[66]​ This is why the undefined role and duties of the Turkish military as an important element in Turkey’s political life,​[67]​ and the need for “the accountability systems and transparency to be strengthened”​[68]​ along with the cursory amendments to Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code concerning freedom of expression in Turkey, continue to be regarded by the EU as disquieting.​[69]​
In addition: 
Turkey has still not ratified the three additional Protocols to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the field of human rights and the protection of minorities whilst during the reporting period, the ECHR delivered a total of 266 judgments [increased to 553 in 2010] finding that Turkey had violated the ECHR in relation to the right to a fair trial and protection of property rights.​[70]​
As far as the freedom of assembly is concerned, “arbitrary limitations have been applied in practice to the right to peaceful assembly”.​[71]​ In specific, “the Turkish Grand National Assembly plays a limited role in the formulation and implementation of Turkey’s accession strategy” as Turkey’s 2010 Progress Report concludes.​[72]​ The closure cases brought by the Chief Public Prosecutor against the AKP (14 March 2008) when it was accused of anti-secularism, and against the Democratic Society Party (DTP) for separatism (16 November 2007) were actually just the tip of the iceberg. The Turkish elections of 12 June 2011 witnessed a similar abuse of justice when the Turkish Supreme Election Board (22 June 2011) removed an independent deputy – supported by the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party – from Diyarbakır on terrorism charges.​[73]​ Such allegations confirm the true dominance of the military (Kemalist-secularist) structures in Turkey – intertwined with the ‘deep state’​[74]​ – whilst depriving “political actors of an adequate level of protection from the state’s interference in their freedom of association and freedom of expression”.​[75]​ Similarly, the leaking of two military coups planned by high military officials against the AKP (2004),​[76]​ and the attempt by the military, together with the main opposition Republican People’s Party (the CHP), to boycott Abdullah Gül’s nomination via an ‘e-coup’ (website intervention) for the Presidential office (2007) because of his Islamic background are indicative of obstacles raised by the state’s military wing in its struggle to maintain its structural role unaltered whereas Kurdish arrests more recently hinder AKP’s efforts towards democratization.​[77]​ 
Finally, further limitations reported by the EU concern restrictions on use of languages other than Turkish in political life, education and contacts with public services. Albeit Kurdish broadcasting has received authorization (the opening of new local radio channel, Muş FM and the Kurdish-language TRT 6 TV channel in 2009),​[78]​ still “political debates or general entertainment programmes in Kurdish are virtually impossible to find on private television channels”​[79]​ whereas whether the Kurdish language will be taught as an elective course within the public school system remains to be seen.​[80]​ Another concern is that Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, or the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.​[81]​ Furthermore, the preservation of the 1982 Constitution, as the product of the most undemocratic decade in Turkey’s political history, along with Kurdish concerns over upcoming insufficient changes in it as regards the minority rights reveal that any progress is slow and difficult.​[82]​ Such developments not only contradict Turkey’s final acceptance of Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) but raise questions as to whether the country has moved forward at all on particular issues.​[83]​ This can be further reinforced by a reading of the EU’s 2011, 2010 and 2009 reports on Turkey which seemingly have not advanced much since 2008 since they claim that “effective coordination structures, administrative capacity and implementing rules... still need to be established [as] preparations in this area are at an early stage”.​[84]​
Turkey’s future completion of the Copenhagen Criteria and its subsequent entrance into the EU – in the sense that the EU represents a democratic organization consisting of democratic members – should be welcomed. However, the resolution of the Kurdish Issue prior to an EU entrance holds great significance for the Kurds per se and probably for Turkish politics as well. Not only would it be a contributory factor to Turkey’s acceptance by the EU and simplify the whole process, but would probably result in a better, mutually beneficial solution between the Kurds and Ankara as the “Kurds would not be satisfied even if Turkey would accomplish the Copenhagen criteria since the EU recognizes individual and not collective rights”​[85]​. In that sense, Turkey’s entrance into the EU seems dependent on an a priori political and peaceful resolution of the Kurdish Issue, but this can only be achieved through a compromise between the Kurdish and Turkish demands. However, military attitudes traditionally hostile to Turkey’s EU membership, and even though apparently changing, still uncertain, along with the existence of the Kurdish Issue, and Turkey’s “persistence in interpreting the Kurdish Issue as a ‘PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) problem of terrrism’ that must be fought against have not only put this project in jeopardy, but seemingly deprived the Turkish bureaucracy of the possibility of reaching a modus vivendi by applying political and diplomatic peaceful means so far”.​[86]​ Although the threat of the military to Turkish politics today seems to have been eliminated by the rise of the AKP to power, the resolution of the Kurdish Issue is still pending.


4. The Kurdish Issue in Turkey’s Democratic Opening

As is so often the case, Turkey’s democratic opening also depends upon its accession into the EU, but whether Turkey will be accepted or not in the EU ‘family’ is also directly related to the extent to which Ankara will reform its structures to take account of pressing issues such as the resolution of the Kurdish Issue and its domestic politics. The question of how much time the Kurdish Issue will take to resolve is directly linked to the extent of AKP’s desire to accelerate its policy of the democratic opening towards full democratization. Hence, the relation between Turkey’s Kurdish Issue together with its democratization and the Europeanization openings constitutes a ‘vicious triangle’. 
This triangle, disseminated among the same recurring variables, is dependent on the degree of cooperation between the government and Turkey’s democratic circles, but most crucially on AKP’s actual willingness to proceed with the necessary constitutional reforms and finally implement its democratic discourse vis-à-vis the announcement of the Kurdish Initiative in 2009.​[87]​ A key factor in this has been Erdogan’s success in bringing the country’s dominant military structure to heel, as shown by the recent mass resignations of top military commanders, an event without precedent in Turkish history.​[88]​ At the same time, the critical role of PKK in the current Syrian crisis, as well as AKP’s need of the Kurdish support in its plan to construct a new constitution imply that Ankara should now consider the importance of gaining the cooperation of the Kurds as key factor in the country’s democratization process. The proposed progressive steps under the governance of the AKP regarding Turkey’s Kurdish Issue are some of the most promising signs for future developments the country has ever seen. This has been evidenced by the AKP’s first historical meeting with representatives of “the pro-Kurdish DTP (Democratic Society Party) (13 September 2009) to discuss the government’s Kurdish initiative”,​[89]​ and thereafter the two-day visit of Beşir Atalay, the Interior Minister, to Diyarbakir in an effort “to live in peace and fraternity, possessing all our freedoms” in addition to the meeting between Leyla Zana and Erdoğan (2 July 2012) and the “Oslo Talks” (2009-2011).​[90]​ Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s participation in the September 2009 meeting as chairman of the AKP rather than Prime Minister carries implications that are two-fold. Not only does it reveal his reservations towards the reactions of the Turkish state/secularist circles, but also indicates the continuing advance of Turkey’s (still prohibited) Kurdish Issue towards resolution.​[91]​
Despite Kurdish concerns over the latest thirty-five civilian killings in the air attacks of Turkish military in Şırnak province (January 2012), writings about AKP’s plans to create professional army units to combat Kurdish militants​[92]​ and to build eighty-six new prisons in Kurdish areas by 2015​[93]​ in addition to Yavuz’s claims about AKP’s lack of any “comprehensive plan to address the Kurdish question”​[94]​ and the government’s ‘hidden agenda’ vis-à-vis its perception of the Kurds as Muslims rather than as a distinctive ethnic identity, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Kurdish Initiative still appears to give the only green light at the moment that could end the long period of Kurdish waiting. If it goes ahead at present rates of acceleration and given the current regional political setting found under transformation, it could potentially bring about a political settlement of the Kurdish Issue within the coming decade or so.​[95]​ Beşir Atalay’s comment that the process of opening will continue despite Ankara’s PKK policy is indicative of AKP’s determination to solve its Kurdish Issue.​[96]​ Yet, this compels that Ankara has first to realize the creation of PKK as Kurdish reaction to the state’s security approach to the Kurdish issue and then to dissociate the latter from Turkey’s discourse on a problem of terrorism. The emergence of the Kurdish Issue has occupied Turkey’s domestic agenda for 30 years, but became a matter of major concern only with the capture of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan (Kenya, 1999) and the US direct involvement which put the Kurdish Issue under the spotlight internationally since the Turkish decision-making leadership had to face it openly. Posing yet another threat for the Kemalist order was the further support for Turkey’s Kurdish opening shown by the AKP’s victory (46.6 per cent in July 2007), which was undoubtedly boosted by Erdoğan’s good relationship with the US coinciding with the initiative of Bush’s Middle Eastern vision of democratization.​[97]​
The Turkish state’s compromise with the Islamic threat demonstrated by its acceptance of Erdoğan’s prominence on the current Turkish political scene vis-à-vis AKP’s public legitimization through its victorious re-election (with 49.9 per cent in June 2011) has seemingly paved the way for the possible solution of the second fundamental question facing Turkey during this time –the confrontation of the controversial Kurdish Issue. Although the Kurdish Issue has so often affected Turkish politics, it is only now that the government appears willing to take steps to address it.​[98]​ Thus, the basic players in the domestic and international arena, whether Kemalists, Islamists, or the US, have apparently only just started to come to terms with what is going on as Turkey’s Kurdish policy to date is primarily limited to fighting PKK. Indeed, as Yunus Oruç remarked already in 2009 “...now everybody has understood the mistakes of the past...I therefore believe that now everyone is well-intentioned”.​[99]​ Even the military “has become tired of the Kurdish Issue and wants its resolution”, while Erdoğan “has the willingness and takes initiatives to solve the Kurdish Issue as a matter [that] obviously portrays Kurdish injustice”.​[100]​ However, it seems likely that its resolution will preoccupy Turkish politics for the coming decade given the disagreement of its parties over a mutual solution. Another caveat when predicting a successful resolution is that the AKP (or another authority supportive of democratic policies) must of course remain in power, and that Erdoğan (or his successor(s)) must continue to maintain control over the military. 
What is also certain is that Turkey’s democratization process, while stimulated by the rise within the government of the Islamic AKP along with its progress towards Europeanization, has, to a great extent, been supported by the US administration.​[101]​ George W. Bush’s objective of making sure “that democracy is firm” in Turkey as a NATO ally,​[102]​ has been succeeded by Barack Obama’s commitment (4 June 2009) to continue to support human rights and democratic principles in the Middle East​[103]​ as well as the Europeanization of Turkey as “a critical ally”.​[104]​ Turkey’s presentation as a full democracy in need of a bit more progress in order to attain its EU status indicates that US foreign policy practice and discourse towards Turkey as a diachronic partner remains unaltered.​[105]​ On these grounds, incidents such as the Turkish parliament’s historical rejection (1 March 2003) of the US proposal to send its troops to fight Iraq through Turkey have not ultimately had a negative effect on the balance of US-Turkish relations. If Turkey’s Europeanization process has positively affected Turkey’s opening towards democratization, which in turn is expected to advance Turkey’s opening up to the Kurdish Issue, the policies of Erdoğan and Obama who both appear more pacifist than their predecessors, can also be held responsible for Turkey’s further liberalizing tendencies. Incidents such as the agreement of both the US and the Kurdish side about “the opening of a DTP office in Washington” during a meeting in Ankara (August 2009)​[106]​ along with the leak of Erdoğan’s government ‘Road Map’ for the Kurdish Issue, stand out as promising prospects for future progress.​[107]​ Not only US administration’s support of Öcalan’s right to a fair trial along with Kurdish rights in Turkey,​[108]​ but also the US policy of supporting minorities worldwide has made clear the desire of the US, though not the degree of its determination, for the settlement of the Kurdish cause.​[109]​ Nowadays, the US appear to condemn detentions of Kurdish elected officials and other pro-Kurdish figures in fear of a setback that such policies could bear upon the Kurdish initiative and thus damage AKP’s credibility among the Kurds. ​[110]​ Nevertheless, any attempt towards Turkey’s opening necessitates public support, something that nowadays is apparently becoming reactivated. For the first time in its political history, Turkey’s carte blanche policy no longer seems to be legitimized – at least to the extent it used to be – by the citizenship.​[111]​ At the same time, the proposal of the resolution of the Kurdish Issue stands out as a critical factor in Turkey’s politics and in the state’s EU accession.​[112]​ Developments such as the Turkish-Armenian accords on bilateral diplomatic relations after long-lasting enmity and the current Arab uprisings carry their own symbolism, and additional pressure to bring about a fresh direction in Turkey’s democratic history under Erdoğan’s governance. 
The current regional course of events considering the enmity between Israel and Hezbollah, the extent of the US involvement in Syria’s use of violence against its citizens, and finally the Turkish stance (in all these) will also help determine Turkish internal debate on the draft of a new constitution which in turn is directly linked to the resolution of the Kurdish Issue. Whereas most EU countries (such as Britain, Greece, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, Germany) favour Turkey’s accession on condition that the Copenhagen Criteria are fulfilled, France still stands against Turkey’s Europeanization given its Islamic status, and probably also its overpopulation.​[113]​ The view of Yunus Oruç that “Turkey will get into the EU in the coming 10 to 12 years if the speed of the current string of developments continues its present momentum”, whereas “if the EU follows a sincere policy of support in favour of Turkey’s entrance then we could enter earlier”, reveals the nature of EU-Turkish relations at present.​[114]​ Such relations could, however, be possibly foiled by military and political Turkish circles where the majority “does not support Turkey’s accession into the EU, [being] oriented towards Eurasia with the focal point being Central Asia”​[115]​ regardless of “the government’s eagerness” to join the Union.​[116]​ Indeed, Turkish opposition, not only to the country’s Europeanization and democratization initiatives, but also to the resolution of the Kurdish Issue, has so far stemmed mainly from limitations posed by the state’s military apparatus exercising its expanded authority in politics. However, Turkey’s EU status can also be impeded by groups that favour only the economic benefits that the country’s candidacy status entails, or the revival of the military position that views with mistrust any Turkish opening beyond the well-defined framework of the state established post-Mustafa Kemal by the military leadership since it could jeopardise, or even destroy the traditional Turkish structure where the military hold a privileged position as state guardians. It seems therefore that the AKP’s best bet is not only to convince through its secular policies, but also to implement the necessary reforms and structural changes, so that it can achieve its goal of democratization by completing the country’s Europeanization process. However, the latter is entangled with the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish Issue as an identity problem. It is a headache “not only for Turkey, but for Europe as well due to the large Kurdish population living there”​[117]​ and carries dimensions of economic, cultural, social and political questioning.​[118]​ On these grounds, the idea that “when democratization is completed, only then will the military get back to its place...the camp”, has nowadays become common among Turkey’s political forces, but unless all the mechanisms of the state participate in its solution “the Kurdish Issue cannot be solved”.​[119]​ Yet, there have been considerable reservations, especially in the light of announcements like Campbell Brown’s presentation (CNN, 21/08/2009) when a map naming the South Eastern regions in Turkey as Kurdistan was made public. Such disclosures could impact negatively on Turkey’s attempts for a peaceful resolution of its Kurdish Issue since they misrepresent current Kurdish claims to autonomy as demands for independence. 


5. A Kurdish Political Agenda for the 21st Century: The Road to Özerklik

In contrast to the 20th century’s Kurdish claims for independence, the Kurds nowadays “no longer interpret their problem either in terms of leftist ideologies or on the basis of the establishment of a nation-state. But “... [we] interpret autonomy in terms consistent with the needs of the 21st century.” Thus, Kurdish claims to “fundamental rights for identity, education, and culture ensured under Constitutional guarantees without alteration of the borders so that a situation of peaceful co-existence will prevail”, constitutes the core of Turkey’s Kurdish Issue today.​[120]​ Yet, there are Kurdish voices supporting that autonomy is no longer enough. Even though the percentage of Kurdish votes has increased dramatically in more recent elections in Turkey with the Kurds emerging as a politically organized and powerful power in the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Peace and Democracy Party), still their participation in the political system is problematic vis-à-vis the latest verdicts on BDP’s members, whereas the PKK’s domination over Kurdish politics is generally highlighted. However, there are various other organizations “engaged with issues of migration, poverty, human rights, art, and civilization ... related to political parties”.​[121]​ Apart from the Kurdish political parties of HAK-PAR (Hak ve Özgür lükler Partisi, Party of Justice and Freedom) and KADEP (Katilinci Demokrasi Partisi, Party of Participatory Democracy), support is attracted mainly to the BDP, the successor of the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic Society Party, 2005).​[122]​ Unofficially, the role of Kongra-Gel (ex-KADEK, ex-PKK) has taken a lead in Turkey’s Kurdish politics. The initiatives of its leadership for the Kurdish cause are indicative.​[123]​ Even though the operations of Kongra-Gel’s military wing have cost Kurdish lives, and made Kurdish politics harder, though not necessarily always exerting a negative influence, the PKK’s activities overall have, to a great extent, contributed to the exposure of the Kurdish Issue internationally, and the Kurdish consciousness of their identity.​[124]​ Whereas today AKP expresses the certainty that “Turkey cannot enter the EU without the resolution of the Kurdish Issue”,​[125]​ the Kurds support the view that they “do not know if, and whether, AKP has a concrete or any Kurdish policy since publicly there have not been any signs apart from some statements”.​[126]​ The feeling that “AKP’s Kurdish opening initiates the end of past state policies that denied Kurdish identity” is also general and optimistic.​[127]​ Within this context, the end to Abdullah Öcalan’s isolation ten years after his capture is justified.​[128]​ With regard to the EU, if the Turkish government will indeed accept the Kurdish offer as portrayed in the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ model currently proposed mainly by the BDP in Turkey including Abdullah Öcalan, not only will the PKK phenomenon of the last 30 years be eliminated, but Turkey’s EU accession, and thus the country’s democratization, will be finally facilitated. Otherwise, “even if Turkey accomplishes the Copenhagen criteria, the Kurds still will not be satisfied, since the EU recognizes individual and not collective rights” with regard to the Kurdish Issue.​[129]​ 
In contrast to Iraq’s federalism, the model of ‘Demokratik Özerklik’ and not ‘Otonomi’ is a system of governance considering Turkey’s political particularities as well as its political history.​[130]​ Specifically, it reflects an administrative model based on “the creation of 20 different self-administrative regions where legislation, economy, and defence will be under the control of Ankara, whereas the rest of the political and administrative authorities will belong to these governments”.​[131]​ On the condition of constitutional guarantees, the model aims at the “decentralization and the social, political, administrative empowerment of the local governments”.​[132]​ However, I consider that in the long run a form of a federal model of governance, exactly because of Turkey’s heterogenous society, might be a more realistic and viable solution to successfully bring about peaceful co-existence for the Kurds as citizens of a different ethnic background in Turkey. Even then, the US and EU pressures on the issues of Turkey’s minorities’ rights, and the completion of Turkey’s democratization process apart from the prevalence of the political over the Kemalist military wing within the country appear the only combination of conditions that might conceivably facilitate a political solution to the Kurdish Issue.​[133]​ Under these circumstances, if governmental policy speeches and Kurdish proposals can be transformed into concrete action, then it is very likely in the coming decade or so that one will no longer speak about the existence of a Kurdish Issue in Turkey, and definitely not the restrictive Turkish structure employed over the last 80 years.


Conclusion 

The empirical-political implications of the Kurdish role in Turkey’s Europeanization and democratization attempts as laid out in the preceding text, also lead naturally to certain theoretical implications. The one most immediately obvious is the role that non-state actors such as the Kurds or the PKK in particular play within international politics. Empirically, this article has pointed out that – apart from the question of where sovereignty lies – Islam shares a common ideological basis with Democracy within their modes of governance, both in its egalitarian principle and its commitment to the ‘common good’ alongside the much commented –on principle and practice of shura. The reason why so much of the literature presents Islam in competition with democracy, or in conflict with the rationale on which the popularity of democracy is grounded today, even ideologically, can be attributed to the prioritization of the collective good over societal oligarchy.​[134]​ On this basis, Middle East states could adopt the smooth functioning of democracy as a pattern in favour of a more harmonious polity, but develop it according to their needs. The truth is that in reality the practice of democracy has deteriorated to a considerable extent, as has also been the case with Islamic societies and their alienation from the notion of the ummah and its conceptual implications. In the Turkish case it has been shown that if one overall factor can be held responsible historically for hindering Turkey’s democratic opening, it is not religion, but the military structure of the state. This explains Turkey’s structural differences compared to other Middle Eastern states, and particularly the differences relating to the historical origins of the formation of their polities. It also explains ideological differences that question the time-worn singling out of Turkey as an exceptional case and paradigm that the rest of the Middle Eastern societies should follow, making such comparisons between them precarious. If Turkey is to give ideas to the rest of the Middle Eastern world, it will be through its adoption of a pluralistic way of governance that will act as an inspiration for Middle Eastern societies to improve their polities. This will doubtless be the case when Turkey has become a full democracy, although for the time being the country is still at a critical stage in its on-going process towards democratization. The AKP’s rise to power signals serious developments that have launched the country into a European, and thus a democratic, trajectory. In its revivalist ideology supporting modernity, the combination of Islam and Kemalism together appears to be the most powerful ambassador for Kemal’s vision of Westernization. It is interesting that the AKP’s rise as an Islamist party in power on one hand and on the other the Kurdish Issue’s vigorous resurrection in politics has led to an emphatic call to the Turkish state to address the two most sensitive issues in its history which, until very recently, were viewed as threats. The AKP’s electoral victory seems to have contributed to the partial solution of Turkey’s problem. The placing of an Islamist party in the driving seat of state rule is indicative. It would be quite ironic were the resolution of the Kurdish Issue to take place through the settling of the role of Islam as the number one state threat in Turkey. However, so far, internal and external powers (the most important being US support) seem to favour both the restoration of Islam on the Turkish political scene, and the resolution of the Kurdish Issue as dictated by US vital interests in the area which Turkey appears willing and keen to serve.​[135]​
The evidence explored in this article has also pointed to the existence of a ‘vicious (or potentially virtuous) triangle’ between Turkey’s Europeanization process, the Kurdish Issue, and democratization attempts. In showing that Turkey’s EU accession depends on the resolution of a series of issues including the Kurdish Issue – subject to the state’s reforms for democratic changes – it has also demonstrated how Turkey’s achievement of democratization rests on the completion of Turkey’s Europeanization process which is in turn reliant on the resolution of the Kurdish Issue.​[136]​ This makes structural changes in the three elements that make up this ‘vicious triangle’ imperative. Today, the Kurdish Issue appears more than ever ripe for resolution since the rationalism of a peaceful coexistence as a ‘democratic cheque’ prevails among its various parts. Not only has Turkish society become more tolerant, but the Kurds also appear more clear-minded regarding their goals and desires. However, whether all the different forces operating in Turkey have yet realized the need for democratization remains to be seen. Specifically, the AKP seems to have a long way to go in its battle for Turkey’s further reformation, unless compromises can be made between the Kurdish side and those Turkish circles resistant to the changes, whether military, governmental or Turkish opposition, so that a middle ground can be reached before an EU admission. If this outcome is achieved, not only will it lead to the resolution of the Kurdish Issue, but also simplify Turkey’s EU process. The revelation of a hard-core Kemalist clandestine organization in pursuit of illegal activities in order to overthrow the status quo, the ER (Ergenekon) is one of several alarming developments that could endanger Turkey’s democratic future if repeated, and thus threaten AKP’s hold over the power of the military.​[137]​
The most important development, though, is that if Ankara should eventually implement an actual Kurdish policy (rather than just a discourse), Turkey’s Kurdish movements – including the PKK which bears a large share in the costly violence in the South East of Turkey, but equally has been prominent in highlighting Turkey’s Kurdish Issue and Kurdish realization of their identity – are now much more likely to stop inciting the rebellion and disorder caused by their currently problematic co-existence, and consent to a peaceful and democratic solution. Instead of BDP’s claims for Democratic Autonomy as the most appropriate Kurdish mode of governance, it seems that in the long term a successful route to a Turkish democracy would be through a so-called ‘Ottoman Millet’ style of system, addressing the needs of both ethnic groups. In a modern Turkish version of this federal kind of governance aimed at the full inclusion of both Turks and Kurds, the parameters would be based around ethnicity rather than religion, thus making it the best possible administrative model of the governance of the state. If this bi-national entity were adopted, the resolution of the Kurdish Issue would no longer be a far off dream, but a practical reality. 
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